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The basic gains-from-trade theorem makes a stark comparison between completely free trade and complete
autarky.  This paper is motivated by recent evidence that trade has greatly expanded on the extensive
margin (aka fragmentation, offshoring) by adding newly traded goods and services and that much
of this new trade is in intermediates.  I provide an extension of existing gains-from-trade results by
allowing trade in an added set of final and/or intermediate goods.  As seems generally understood,
a sufficient condition for all countries to gain from fragmentation is that the relative world prices of
initially-trade goods don’t change.  However, trade costs break the strict link between domestic and
world prices in my approach and this results in interesting subtleties as initially-traded goods change
their trade status following fragmentation.  I illustrate these results by applying them to two recent
and quite specific formulations of expansion at the extensive margin: Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2008) and Markusen and Venables (2007).  Symmetry in two senses results in gains for all countries:
countries are relatively symmetric in size and the newly-traded goods are relatively symmetric in their








There has been a lot of recent interest in the expansion of trade at the extensive
margin, in which innovations in communications, transportation, and institutions have
permitted a wider range of goods and services to be traded.  This added trade at the extensive
margin goes by a variety of names including “fragmentation”, “vertical specialization”,
“trade in tasks”, and “offshoring”.  These added goods and services have generally been
modeled as intermediates, though there is no compelling reason to make such an assumption.  
The basic gains-from-trade theorem which we all teach makes the stark comparison
between completely free trade and complete autarky.  While this is an important benchmark,
no one claims that it is a very relevant comparison.  Some generalizations are relatively
straightforward, such as comparing restricted trade versus more liberal trade.  In this latter
case, requirements for gains are more demanding than in the simple free-trade versus autarky
case: losses from liberalization are possible due to adverse world price changes.  
The analysis and analytical tools needed to address fragmentation are rather different
from those of traditional trade theory and computational analysis, in which a liberalization
generates more trade in an existing set of goods and services.  Applied general-equilibrium
modeling has long suffered from failing to deal with trade at the extensive margin.  Now we
must focus on discrete changes in which liberalization switches some goods and services
from non-traded to traded status and indeed some previously-traded goods could become
non-traded or no longer produced in some countries.  In analytical theory, many analyses use
“cones” for example, which are fine in aiding our intuition about changes in specialization
but relevant unit-value isoquants are going to move around with the general-equilibrium price
changes that must accompany fragmentation.  In short, analytical theory has been confounded
by an inability to solve for world general equilibrium price changes and computational
analysis by difficulties with “corner solutions” that are fundamental to understanding the
consequences of fragmentation. 
The purpose of this paper is to try to make progress in a more general approach to the
gains from trade due to expansion of trade at the extensive margin.  I begin with a general
gains-from-trade result in which there are two sets of goods, traded and non-traded, any of
which can be used as an intermediate and/or final good.   An initially non-traded good could,
for example, be produced by a single primary factor of production such as labor, making that
good identical to a Grossman - Rossi-Hansberg (2008) “task”.  There are (or can be) trade
costs on initially traded goods such that the relationship between domestic and world prices
is not strictly pinned down by the latter: the domestic price differs according to whether the
good is exported, imported, or non-traded.   Liberalization takes the form of allowing trade in
the non-traded goods.  A given country may or may not start trading some of these goods,
and any initially traded good may change its trade status. 
The gains-from-trade result shows that a sufficient condition for all countries to gain
from fragmentation is that the world relative prices of the initially-traded goods do not
change.  While this seems generally understood in models with costless trade, this severe
condition is the weakest condition for Pareto improvements in standard models with no trade
costs: with any change in world prices, the sufficient condition must fail for at least one2
1The idea that gains moving from restricted (but positive) trade to more-liberal trade requires
ruling out “on average” terms-of-trade losses is not new, though I don’t know who to credit (a folk
theorem?).  I have had a proof of this in my PhD course notes since the late 1970s, but am not
claiming credit for it.  An excellent general discussion is found in Deardorff (2008) and the result is
noted for trade in “tasks” in Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2010). Added references are welcome.  A
simple example of losses from liberalization: a large country that unilaterally drops its optimal tariff is
going to be worse off due to the resulting terms-of-trade deterioration.
country.  With trade costs, this need not be the case since domestic prices of initially-trade
goods may move differently from world prices as goods change their trade status.  Pareto
improving gains are possible in spite of some movement in world prices.
1
The sufficient conditions still seem severe and so the paper then turns to two specific
cases that have been analyzed in the last couple of years.  The point is to get some idea about
what sort of general circumstances might lead us to expect that gains from trade should hold
for all countries and, equally importantly, what might be the “markers” for suspecting that a
country might lose.  Both examples use a simple Heckscher-Ohlin world with two initially-
traded final goods and two primary factors, and no trade in intermediates.  One formulation is
a modification of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), who model intermediates as “tasks”,
each task using one unit of a primary factor and each final good using all tasks.  The two final
goods differ in the amount of each labor task they use relative to the amount of each capital
(skilled-labor) task they use.  Then some subset of tasks, for example some of the labor-
intensive tasks, become tradable.  The other formulation is a modification of  from Markusen
and Venables (2007), with three intermediate goods producing the two final goods: a capital-
intensive intermediate, a labor-intensive intermediate, and a middle intermediate.  The
capital-intensive final good uses the first two and the labor-intensive final good uses the last
two.  With only final goods initially traded, one or more of the intermediates then become
tradable.
Both examples suggest that the sufficient conditions for gains and actual (numerical)
gains are likely to occur to all countries when the countries and the fragmentation itself is
relatively “symmetric”.   The countries are symmetric (by definition) when they are
approximately the same size though differing in relative factor endowments.  The
fragmentation is symmetric when, for example, both a labor-intensive intermediate or task
and a capital-intensive intermediate or task are both introduced into trade together.  These
two symmetries minimize or in the case of perfect symmetry eliminate terms-of-trade
changes that violate the sufficient condition for gains.  Numerical solutions in which one
country loses always involve a deterioration in the terms of trade for the losing country as the
general result requires, and always involve one of the two symmetries being violated.  But
the numerical solutions also emphasize the “sufficiency” part of the general result in that
there are clear examples of where a country gains in spite of a significant terms-of-trade loss.
The final section is an adaptation of  Markusen and Venables (2007) in which we
propose a new geometric tool to analyze problems such as fragmentation in the presence of
country-specific trade costs.  Our “box” is a matrix of countries, with a country’s factor
endowments on one axis and a country’s trade costs on the other.  Every cell in the matrix is
a distinct country, and all countries trade together simultaneously.  Thus not only can a3
capital abundant country be compared to a labor-abundant country, a high-trade-cost capital-
abundant country can be compared to a low-trade-cost capital-abundant country.  The gains-
from-trade result, or its violation, is nicely illustrated with this technique.  Finally, all of these
examples show that, due to trade costs, there are lots of cases where an initially traded final
good becomes non-tradable and this is to the benefit of that country, illustrating another
important feature of the gains-from-trade result.
2. A general gains-from-trade result
There are two sets of goods, X and Y goods.  X are initially traded and Y are initially
non-traded. pi and qi denote the domestic prices for Xi and Yi.  Any X or Y good may be used
as an intermediate in any other good and may have no final use. A Y good could be produced
with a single primary factor and used as an intermediate in all X goods, which is a Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg’s (2008) “task”.  
We will use a simple trade-cost formulation from Markusen and Venables (2007). 
Assume the usual iceberg trade costs, and conceive of each country exporting and importing
from a central entrepot.  Costs are paid in both directions.  Let superscript w denote world
prices, and let t >1 denote the (gross) trade cost to our country in question.  For one unit of a
good exported, 1/t arrives, so if its world price at the entrepot is p
w, then price received for a
unit of (unmelted) exports (E) must be p
w/t for the value to balance (  p
w(E/t) at the entrepot
equals (p
w/t)E exported). Similarly, an import good’s domestic price is p
wt. With t $ 1, the
domestic price of an initially-tradable X good i must fall in the interval
(1)
The domestic price pi must lie at the left-hand boundary if it is an import good, at the right-
hand boundary if it is an export good, and (weakly) in between if it is a non-traded good.  
Xi and Yi will denote the total (gross) output of these goods. The following notation is
used for domestic intermediate use (of which some part might be imported X or Y).  
      intermediate use of Xj in Xi
      intermediate use of Yj in Xi
      intermediate use of Xj in Yi
      intermediate use of Yj in Yi
value of X intermediate use in Xi
value of Y intermediate use in Xi
value of X intermediate use in Yi
value of Y intermediate use in Yi4
There are m primary factors V in inelastic in supply, with domestic prices wi. 
factor m used in Xi factor m used in Yi
Let superscript f denote the quantity or domestic price of a good when trade in Y
goods (fragmentation) is permitted and superscript n denote quantities and domestic prices
when Y goods are not traded.   Profit maximization in X industry i means that the profits for
industry i at f-prices and f-quantities are (weakly) greatly than the value of any other feasible
set of inputs and output at f-prices: in particular, the n-quantities which are feasible by
definition  
(2)
Sum over all i industries
(3)
Similarly for Y industries
(4)
Add the (3) and (4) together, noting that total primary factor usage on both sides at
prices w
f cancel out (on both sides of the equation usage sums to the (inelastic) total supply).
(5)
The sum of (3) and (4) then simplifies to:
(6)
Rearrange the terms on the right-hand side of (6)
(7)5
2The terminology here is not ideal, but I haven’t come up with a better one.  “Domestic”
prices for trade goods here are world prices in the sense that they are the prices at which a country can
trade.  I am reserving the term “world” prices for p
w , the relative prices at the entrepot if you like. 
Defined this way, trade must balance at domestic prices as indicated.  This would not be true with
tariffs, in which case domestic prices do not equal the prices at which a country trades.
The left-hand side of (7) is the value of net output in the f equilibrium and so, by the
balance-of-trade constraint, is equal to the value of final consumption (subscript c) in the f
equilibrium.  Trade must balance at domestic prices (p
wt for an import or p
w/t for an export). 
With no tariffs, the domestic price of any initially traded good will equal the world price
corrected for trade costs.  For any initially-non-traded good, production minus intermediate
use equals consumption and so such a good cancels out of the balance-of-trade constraint at
any price.  The balance-of-trade constraint can thus be written in terms of domestic prices for
all goods, traded and non-traded.
2  The left-hand side of (7) equals the value of consumption
in the f equilibrium.
(8)
Y goods are non-trade in the n equilibrium, so the second term on the right-hand side
of (7) (net output of Y good) is just the value of the consumption of Y goods in the n
equilibrium evaluated at f prices.
(9)
Substitute (8) and (9) for the relevant terms in (7), then (7) becomes
(10)
Trade balance in the n equilibrium is given by:
(11)
Add (11) to the right-hand side of (10), also add and subtract  from the right-
hand side, and (10) becomes
(12)
The first term on the right-hand side of (12) is the value of the n-equilibrium consumption at
f-equilibrium prices which we can denote as:6
(13)
Finally, note that the second and third bracketed terms on the right-hand side of (12)
are net exports of X goods in the n-equilibria: total output minus domestic intermediate use
minus domestic consumption, the second term values at f-prices and the third term valued at
n-prices.  Let net exports be given by
k =f, n (14)
Then using (13) and (14), (12) becomes:
(15)
Gains from allowing trade in Y goods makes the country better off if the left-hand side
of (15) exceeds the first term on the right-hand side: the value of f-equilibrium consumption
at f-equilibrium prices exceeds the value of n-equilibrium consumption at f-equilibrium
prices; that is, f-equilibrium consumption is revealed preferred.
Suppose that fragmentation leaves relative world prices of X goods unchanged and
refer back to (1).  Consider an initially-exported good   > 0, so that its initial domestic
price is equal to 1/t times the world price:  , with the world price held constant by
assumption after trade in Y is allowed.
good i continues to be exported
good i becomes non-traded (16)
good i switches to an import
If export good i becomes non-traded or an import good, it’s price cannot be lower than the
price at which it could be exported,  , and so   for   > 0 when
i switches to an import or to non-traded.  The argument and inequalities in (16) also hold for
any initially imported good:    when   < 0 initially and switches to an
export or to non-traded..   
Thus for any X good, that term in the right-hand summation in (15) must be non-
negative.  From (15), this is in turn a sufficient condition for 
 (17)
Trade in the f-equilibrium is revealed preferred to trade in the n-equilibrium for any/all
countries.7
General Result:
A sufficient condition for adding trade in Y goods to (weakly) improve the welfare of
all countries is that the world relative prices of the X goods are unchanged.  
A sufficient condition for adding trade in Y goods to improve the welfare of a given
country is that the value of its initial net-export vector at post-Y-trade prices is
positive:   (the initial net export vector would now
generate a surplus; “on average”, the terms-of-trade do not get worse).
Because   is defined at trade-cost-adjusted domestic prices, it is
possible that this condition can be satisfied for all countries, contrary to the
usual case where trade costs are zero.
Again, (a) this does not assume domestic prices are unchanged, since some goods may
change their trade status. (b) the result covers Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) as a
special case: Y goods are intermediate “tasks”, with each Y produced with a single factor and
each Y good used in all X goods.
In a formulation with two countries and zero trade costs, the inequality
 cannot hold for both countries.  Both price vectors must equal the world
price vectors in each country, and one country’s net export vector is equal and opposite in
sign to the other country’s vector.  So in fact this term has an equal and opposite value in the
two countries: the sufficient condition cannot hold for one of the countries.  But it is worth
noting that this need not be the case in the presence of trade costs and we will see the
relevance later in the paper.  Suppose that good i is initially exported from country e and
imported in country m, and so the initial price relationships are
(18)
A quick numerical example should make the point.  Let t
2 = 1.2 (making t approximately
1.095) and suppose that the exporter’s price is one and the importer’s price is 1.2.  If the good
becomes non-traded, the domestic price might be 1.1 in each country, in which case the
(initial) exporter’s domestic price rises   and the importer’s price falls
: the sufficient condition in (16) holds as a strict inequality for both countries. 
With reference to the inequalities in (1), the importer’s price moves in from the left-hand
boundary and the exporter’s price moves in from the right-hand boundary.  This is not an
arcane technical point: it will be highly relevant because fragmentation will permit some
countries to stop importing expensive goods and just import the fragment of it that they are
bad at producing themselves.8
3. Example 1: based on Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008)
It is nice to have some specifics to chew on; sufficient conditions in particular leave a
lot of ambiguity and are puzzling in particular if they are unlikely to be satisfied by all
country at the same time.  The first specific case I will show is a much-simplified version of
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) (GRH).  The simple version is shown in Figure 1. 
There are two final goods, X1 and X2 that produce utility, and two primary factors, L and K
which themselves are non-traded.  L is (endogneously) divided into two task, labeled TL1 and
TL2 and similarly for capital.  All goods require all tasks and a particular good requires TK1
and TK2 in identical amounts and there is no substitution between them and similarly for talks
TL1 and TL2.  Where the final goods X1 and X2 differ is in the amounts of labor versus capital
tasks, and X1 is assumed capital intensive.  In the illustration of Figure 1, X1 requires 60 each
of both TK1 and TK2 and 40 each of both TL1 and TL2.  X2 is the symmetric mirror image,
requiring 40 each of TK1 and TK2 and 60 each of TL1 and TL2.
The benchmark is that goods X1 and X2 can be traded while none of the tasks can be
traded initially.  I assume in the simulations that there are trade costs of five percent (t =
1.05) initially, partly to break factor-price equalization for similar countries.  I assume that
there is an elasticity of substitution of 1.0 between K and L nests for both goods and utility is
Cobb-Douglas as well.  Countries can differ in relative and/or absolute factor endowments
and I will compute a series of outcomes over a world Edgeworth box as shown in Table 1. 
The focus is on country h whose origin is at the southwest corner of the box.  Below the NW-
SE diagonal country h is small and above the SW-NE diagonal it is capital abundant.  The
model is solved with GAMS, whose non-linear complementarity solver is extremely robust to
corner solutions.   
The first experiment in Table 1 is to allow costless trade in task TL1 only, no trade in
TL2 or in K tasks, with results in panels A and B.  Note that this is not the same as allowing
labor mobility as strongly emphasized by GRH.  Foreign labor can essentially enter to do task
TL1 but cannot do task TL2, which must be done by domestic labor.  Thus allowing trade in
TL1 may well not equalize labor returns across countries.   The numbers in panel A are the
proportional changes in the welfare of country h relative to the benchmark with X and Y
traded at 5 percent costs (held constant in the experiment).  
Most all welfare changes in Panel A are positive, except of course on the SW-NE
diagonal (no trade).  The changes are naturally bigger when country h is small.  There are
three points of loss which are shaded in Panel A.  Panel B plots proportional changes in the
relative price of country h’s export good, so this is the change in p1/p2 above the NE-SW
diagonal and p2/p1 below (so any plus is a terms-of-trade improvement and a minus is a loss
for h).  Comparing the points of loss in Panel A to the corresponding points in Panel B, we
see that losses in the former are all points of terms-of-trade deterioration in Panel B as
required by the general result above.  However, we also see that this result is only a sufficient
condition in that there are a number of points in Panel B where the terms-of-trade deteriorates
yet welfare improves.  
The intuition behind the points of loss in Panel A, due to the deterioration in the
relative price of X2, country h’s export good at these points, is explained by a sort of9
3Perhaps it is misleading to use the phrase “terms of trade” when a good becomes non-traded;
perhaps a better label would be “the relative price of the country’s comparative advantage good”,
though this seems awkward.  A feature of the general result is that it uses domestic prices (given no
tariffs).  Henceforth, “terms-of-trade” refers to the domestic price ratio.  See also footnote 2.
monopoly-power in trade argument.  Country h is somewhat small than f at these points, and
has a favorable terms of trade (relative price of X2) initially.  But the movement of labor (in
the factor content sense) to country f after liberalization allows f to expand production of X2
more than it shrinks in country h, thus driving down the relative price of X2.  This terms-of-
trade deterioration for h outweighs the trade-creation by exporting task TL1.  
Panels C and D of Figure 2 show the effects of a symmetric experiment in which both
TL1 and TK1 become traded.  All welfare changes in Panel C are positive and symmetric and,
of course, they must also be the same for country f (if we look at cell (i,j) for country h,
country f’s change is given in cell (j,i)).  However, recall that we mentioned above that
differences in country size are also a form of asymmetry.  Thus we see a number of cells in
Panel D in which the relative price of country h’s comparative-advantage good falls
following fragmentation.  The intuition lies in a monopoly or simple scarcity concept.  The
relatively small country has a terms-of-trade advantage when only X1 and X2 are traded. 
Allowing trade in tasks essentially erodes these scarcity rents and the relative price of the
comparative-advantage good falls.  Welfare rises nevertheless at all points in Panel C.  
Another interesting feature of the results is that a large majority of the relative price
changes in Panel B and Panel D of Figure 2 are positive..  How can this be?  Surely in the
symmetric case of Panel D there should be an equal number of negative and positive changes
since the numbers are identically the changes in the (inverse) relative price in country f?  The
explanation lies in one of the final goods becoming non-traded as discussed in section 2,
permitting a positive terms-of-trade (really the domestic price ratio) change in both
countries.
3  
As an example, consider points in the two rows above the SW-NE diagonal in Panels
B and D.  In the first row above the diagonal, the trade cost is such that there is no trade in X1
and X2 initially, and so the opportunity to trade tasks must be welfare improving and the
relative price of the comparative-advantage good must rise; that is rather trivial.  Points two
rows above the diagonal such as point (0.5, 0.3) involve trade in X1 for X2 initially.  The
opportunity to trade tasks leads to an elimination of trade in X2 in Panel B: country h simply
imports task TL1 to complement its scarce labor supply, and produces X2 more cheaply than it
imported it under goods-trade only:    which is an improvement in country
h’s relative price. Country f does better exporting TL1 than in exporting X2 and so this drives
up the relative price of X2 in country f:   for country f which is an
improvement in its relative price.  With reference back to the sufficient conditions in (15) and
(16), this is a clear case where the condition holds for both countries, as it does at a number
of point in both the experiments of Panel B and Panel D: hence the “terms-of-trade”
improvement for both countries (see footnotes 2 and 3).10
4. Example 2: based on Markusen and Venables (2007)
A second example is a significant modification of Markusen and Venables (2007). 
Again, we start with a 2x2x2 Heckscher-Ohlin world, but intermediates are added.  The
model is shown in Figure 2, where there are three symmetric intermediate goods A, B, and C. 
As in GRH, these are pure intermediates and not used in final consumption.  A is the most
capital intensive and is used in X1, B is in the middle and is used in both X1 and X2, and C is
the most labor intensive and is used only in good X2.  At benchmark prices of one (countries
identical), the capital/labor ratio in X1 is 70/30 and that in X2 is 30/70.   Symmetry is built into
the model quite deliberately.  
The numerical model uses the same total factor endowments and preferences as GRH
and Cobb-Douglas substitution is used the upper nest (between intermediate goods) in both
this section and the previous one.   Trade costs for final goods are 5 percent as in the previous
section.  So the two treatments are very similar except for the structure of intermediates. 
Experiments similar to those of Table 1 are shown in Table 2.  Panels A and B consider a
non-symmetric fragmentation in which free trade in C is added to the benchmark of trade in
X1 and X2 only, and the results show some qualitative similarity to GRH.  Panel A of Table 2
shows some points of welfare loss in approximately the same place as Panel A of Table 1
(GRH).  Panels B in the two figures are also similar and show that the points of welfare
losses in both cases are associated with a terms-of -trade deterioration as the general result
requires.   Again, the simulations indicate and emphasize that the general result is a sufficient
condition, in that there are a couple points of terms-of-trade deterioration in which welfare
nevertheless increases.  
Panels C and D of Table 2 allow trade in both A and C intermediates, a symmetric
fragmentation, so the results on welfare and price changes are symmetric.  However, there are
still point of welfare loss for country h (Panel C) and again we see that these are necessarily
associated with adverse changes in the prices of the initially-traded goods.  While the
fragmentation itself is symmetric, the countries are of different size: as in the case of Panel C
of Table 1 (GRH), country h is somewhat smaller is the points of welfare loss.
The welfare losses in Panels A and C of Table 2 have a subtle intuition; we
concentrate on Panel A, for example cell (9,7) of Panel A where the welfare loss is 13.9
percent.  Country h is initially specialized in X2 and has an endowment ratio well suited to
producing the integrated good by dividing its endowment between B and C.  When C can be
traded, country h exports C and country f has a significant expansion in its production of X2.  
This pushes down the relative price of X2 and, while country h gets a small increase in the
price of C this is outweighed by a much bigger fall in the price of B (non-traded).  The
negative effect of the price change in X2 (33 percent in Panel B) causes a fall in country h’s
welfare.  This is somewhat easier to explain in a multi-country context, the subject of the next
section, and we will pick up on the intuition at the end of that section. 11
4The numerical model uses the GAMS MCP solver to solve 36,863 non-linear inequalities in
the same number of complementary non-negative variables.  Code written in Rutherford’s higher-
level MPS/GE language fits onto three pages using GAMS wonderful set features, available upon
request.  Fabulous.  No, I have no financial connection with GAMS corporation.  
5. An extension to a multi-country case
A well-understood limitation of the  world Edgeworth or Dixit-Norman (1980) box
technique is that it is limited to two countries.  There is no sense in which there can be high
trade-cost countries and low trade-cost countries.  This section presents a multi-country
generalization based again on Markusen and Venables (2007).  The structure of production is
the same as in the previous section.  There are two final goods, X1 and X2, and three
intermediate goods: A, B, and C.  A and B are inputs into X1 production and B and C are
inputs into X2 production.   Factor intensities are the same as those shown in Figure 2 and all
countries have identical and homothetic preferences, with shares 50/50.  
There are many countries all of which trade together simultaneously, with each
country identified by a double index, one referring to the country’s endowment ratio and one
referring to its country-specific trade cost (costs to and from the entrepot).  Countries’
endowments are evenly and symmetrically distribution along a line, with the most capital
abundant country having endowments K = 0.90 L = 0.10 and the most labor abundant country
having endowments K = 0.10 L = 0.9.  There are an odd number of countries with the central
country having an endowments K = 0.5 L = 0.5.  A country’s endowment is indexed by j.
Trade costs are country specific and apply to imports and exports from/to all
countries.  We could think of trade costs as being port costs only.  The marginal cost of added
distance is zero.  Bilateral trade flows will thus not be determined, a limitation of the model. 
In addition to an endowment index j, a country has a trade-cost index i, which is common to
all imports and exports.  There are exactly i countries with endowment index j and j countries
with trade-cost index i.  Our countries form an ixj matrix, with exactly one country in each
cell of the matrix.  Unlike the world Edgeworth-box approach, all countries trade at once.
4
We assume that the final goods X1 and X2 are always tradable at a country’s country-
specific trade cost (although autarky is computed as a benchmark).  None, some, or all of the
intermediates may be tradable, at each country’s country-specific trade cost depending on the
experiment.  Primary factors are not tradable as noted above.  “Fragmentation” is short-hand
for the introduction of trade in some previously-non-traded intermediate. Referring back to
the notion of asymmetries, in our example here there is essentially no asymmetry due to
country size, since all countries will be a quite small share of the world endowment.  But
there can be asymmetries in the fragmentation itself in the sense that it is biased toward one
final good or the other.  In the present case, allowing trade in B, trade in A and C, or trade in
A, B, and C are neutral or symmetric fragmentations. Allowing trade in C but not in A and B
is an asymmetric fragmentation.  As your intuition will likely suggest, the latter will increase
the efficiency of X2 production and will lower the price of X2 relative to X1 in equilibrium.  
Figure 3 shows the experiment in which A and C become traded at each country’s
country-specific trade cost, shown in the Y axis (running front to back).  Each cell of the12
5The “plateau” in the back left region of Figure 4 is an area of welfare gains.  These countries
export X1 before and after trade in C is allowed.  They all get an equal terms-of-trade gain as p1/p2
rises (shown in Table 3).
Figure is a country, with most capitalabundant countries at the left and highest-trade-cost
countries in the front; the back row of Figure 3 is a row of countries with zero trade costs (the
view from this angle is better).  The vertical axis plots the proportional welfare gains over
trade in X1 and X2 only (not autarky).  There are countries in the front middle (high-trade
costs, near average endowments) that have zero gains because they do not trade before or
after the liberalization or innovation that allows trade in A and C.  The big gainers are the
fringe countries in terms of endowments: either they stop producing B and specialize in A or
C only (low-trade-cost fringe) or they leave autarky and stop producing intermediate good A
or C (high-trade-cost fringe), importing their disadvantaged intermediate to combine with
domestic good B.   But interestingly, the countries with central relative endowments and
relatively low trade costs gain.  
The reasons for this are indicated in Table 3, where the price index of the zero-trade-
cost country with the average world endowment is used as numeraire.  When trade in A and C
are allowed, fringe countries want to specialize more or completely in A or C, while the
central countries have no incentive to specialize more in B at initial world prices.  So it is
basically a supply-demand issue: at initial relative prices p1/p2, there is excess supply of A
and C and so their prices must fall relative to C to re-establish equilibrium.  Table 3 notes
that, while the relative prices of final goods don’t change, the world price of A and C fall
relative to B, which makes the central countries better off.  
No one loses in this symmetric example with essentially identical country sizes as the
general result suggests: relative world prices of X1 and X2 don’t change.  A few low-trade-
cost countries have zero gains/losses, and these are countries which were well suited to
integrated X1 or X2 production initially, and remain exporters of one final good and importers
of the other after trade in A and C is allowed.
Figure 4 completes the analysis by showing the welfare gains from allowing trade in
C (no trade in A or B) relative to trade in X1 and X2 only.  C is the most labor-intensive
intermediate and this is an opportunity for the labor-abundant countries.  The supply to the
world market of C by these countries pushes down the relative price of X2 and C has a price
below that of X2, though its pre-fragmentation world price is not defined.  Prices are shown in
Table 3.  Figure 4 shows that the most labor intensive countries are significant gainers.  They
become specialized in C and their domestic prices for C rise.  Note that these countries are
significant gainers in spite of the fact that the relative price of their initial export good X2
falls, though this is not a violation of the sufficient condition for many of these countries: X2
switches from being their export good to being non-traded or even imported and (16) is in
fact satisfied despite the fall in the world price of the initially-exported good.
5
The countries that experience losses are moderately labor-abundant countries, who
produce and export good X2 before and after the ability to trade C.  The relative price of their
initial export good falls, violating our sufficient condition, but they cannot escape this by
switching to specializing in and exporting C.  Thus they experience losses as indicated in the
“basin of welfare losses” area of Figure 4.13
6. Summary
The purpose of this paper is to trying to identify some general principles about the
welfare effects of adding newly-traded goods and services to an existing set of traded goods.  
In my view, the existing theory literature is not very satisfactory on this, often because the
tools applied do not allow the researcher to solve for world general equilibrium and world
prices after fragmentation is allowed.  Here I derive a general gains-from-trade result that
gives benchmark sufficient conditions for added trade to be beneficial to one country or to all
countries together.  While this result has clear antecedents in the literature concerning going
from partially liberal trade to more liberalized trade, an important innovation here is to add
trade costs which allow domestic and world prices to differ and which allow some of the
existing set of traded or tradable goods to move in and out of a country’s trade vector
following a liberalization.  
Two specific examples are then examined which are simplifications and
modifications of two recent papers, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and Markusen and
Venables (2007).  In both cases, results are consistent with the central result: a necessary
condition for a country to lose is that it experiences a weighted adverse price change for its
initially trade goods.  At the same time, the sufficiency part of the general result is
emphasized: there many cases in which a country gains substantially in spite of the sufficient
condition failing.   The role of trade costs, which imply that initially-traded goods often
change trade status, is also illustrated and found to be important in these examples: for
example, a country may stop importing an expensive good and only import the fragment of it
that is costly to produce at home.
Results suggest that gains are likely to occur to all countries when the countries and
the fragmentation itself is relatively “symmetric”.   The countries are symmetric (by
definition) when they are approximately the same size.  The fragmentation is symmetric
when, for example, both a labor-intensive intermediate or task and a capital-intensive
intermediate or task are both introduced into trade together.  These two symmetries minimize
or even eliminate terms-of-trade changes that violate the sufficient condition for gains.  14
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FINAL GOODS ALWAYS TRADABLE
INTERMEDIATE GOODS NONE / SOME / ALL TRADABLE 








100 100 100 100Panel A:  proportional change in welfare of country h following trade in TL1
0.9 0.128 0.265 0.216 0.096 0.038 0.018 0.006 0.001
0.8 0.113 0.127 0.143 0.048 0.020 0.007 0.002 0.001
0.7 0.181 0.065 0.055 0.022 0.010 0.002 0.001 0.001
0.6 0.156 0.070 0.030 0.014 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.007
0.5 0.125 0.056 0.022 0.004 0.003 0.008 0.010 0.010
0.4 0.091 0.036 0.007 0.004 0.013 0.019 0.016 0.014
0.3 0.077 0.015 0.007 0.020 0.027 0.024 0.049 0.019
0.2 0.039 0.014 0.034 0.040 0.045 -0.020 0.028 0.097
0.1 0.038 0.071 0.109 0.144 0.129 -0.020 -0.044 0.098
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Panel B: proportional change in the price of h's export good with trade in TL1
0.9 -0.17 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.01
0.8 -0.17 -0.04 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01
0.7 -0.04 -0.07 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01
0.6 -0.04 -0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03
0.5 -0.03 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
0.4 -0.03 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
0.3 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.04
0.2 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.00 -0.09 0.04 0.20
0.1 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.11 -0.10 0.20
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Panel C:  proportional change in welfare of country h following trade in TL1, TK1
0.9 0.229 0.244 0.174 0.075 0.038 0.017 0.007 0.001
0.8 0.127 0.118 0.098 0.051 0.022 0.008 0.002 0.001
0.7 0.124 0.071 0.048 0.026 0.012 0.003 0.002 0.007
0.6 0.189 0.062 0.036 0.017 0.004 0.003 0.008 0.017
0.5 0.162 0.054 0.027 0.006 0.004 0.012 0.022 0.038
0.4 0.130 0.044 0.010 0.006 0.017 0.026 0.051 0.075
0.3 0.091 0.020 0.010 0.027 0.036 0.048 0.098 0.174
0.2 0.050 0.020 0.044 0.054 0.062 0.071 0.118 0.244
0.1 0.050 0.091 0.130 0.162 0.189 0.124 0.127 0.229
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Panel D: proportional change in the price of h's export good with trade in TL1, TK1
0.9 0.00 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.01
0.8 -0.14 0.00 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01
0.7 -0.13 -0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03
0.6 -0.04 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.06
0.5 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.09
0.4 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.13
0.3 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.15
0.2 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.16
0.1 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.13 -0.14 0.00
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9



























World endowment of labor
World endowment of labor
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(50/50 shares in U)
INTERMEDIATE 
GOODS
(50/50 shares in X,Y)
PRIMARY
FACTORS
(10) (90) (50) (50) (90) (10)
FINAL GOODS ALWAYS TRADABLE AT COUNTRY-SPECIFIC TRADE COST
INTERMEDIATE GOODS NONE / SOME / ALL TRADABLE AT COUNTRY-SPECIFIC TRADE COST 




L K L K L KPanel A:  proportional change in welfare of country h following trade in C
0.9 0.035 0.290 0.223 0.115 0.041 0.018 0.004 0.001
0.8 0.000 0.036 0.102 0.044 0.007 0.004 0.001 0.000
0.7 0.000 0.000 0.043 0.011 0.005 0.002 0.001 -0.001
0.6 0.000 0.005 0.022 0.008 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.000
0.5 0.000 0.034 0.012 0.004 0.002 0.004 -0.011 0.000
0.4 0.000 0.021 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.002 -0.003 0.000
0.3 0.007 0.010 0.005 0.010 0.012 -0.026 0.000 0.000
0.2 0.022 0.009 0.016 0.019 -0.021 -0.086 -0.034 0.000
0.1 0.020 0.024 0.032 0.048 -0.024 -0.139 -0.204 -0.034
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Panel B: proportional change in the price of h's export good with trade in C
0.9 0.07 0.64 0.49 0.29 0.15 0.09 0.03 0.01
0.8 0.00 0.07 0.21 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
0.7 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.01
0.6 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00
0.5 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.00
0.4 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.00
0.3 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.06 0.00 0.00
0.2 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 -0.05 -0.17 -0.07 0.00
0.1 0.05 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.14 -0.33 -0.39 -0.07
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Panel C:  proportional change in welfare of country h following trade in A and C
0.9 0.024 0.261 0.197 0.115 0.041 0.016 0.003 0.001
0.8 -0.156 0.024 0.075 0.026 0.006 0.005 0.002 0.001
0.7 -0.098 -0.023 0.024 0.014 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.003
0.6 -0.024 0.018 0.021 0.011 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.016
0.5 0.048 0.037 0.017 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.006 0.041
0.4 0.039 0.027 0.009 0.006 0.011 0.014 0.026 0.115
0.3 0.039 0.016 0.009 0.017 0.021 0.024 0.075 0.197
0.2 0.032 0.016 0.027 0.037 0.018 -0.023 0.024 0.261
0.1 0.032 0.039 0.039 0.048 -0.024 -0.098 -0.156 0.024
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Panel D: proportional change in the price of h's export good with trade in A and C
0.9 0.05 0.58 0.44 0.29 0.15 0.08 0.03 0.01
0.8 -0.30 0.05 0.16 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01
0.7 -0.23 -0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03
0.6 -0.14 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.08
0.5 -0.04 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.15
0.4 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.29
0.3 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.16 0.44
0.2 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.03 -0.05 0.05 0.58
0.1 0.09 0.07 0.02 -0.04 -0.14 -0.23 -0.30 0.05
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
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Figure 3:  Additional gains from allowing trade in A and C (no trade in B)



































































































































































































































basin of welfare lossesp1 p2 pa pc pb
Trade in X1 and X2 only 1.000 1.000 1.000
Add trade in A and C 1.000 1.000 0.952 0.952 1.000
Add trade in C only 1.025 0.976 0.925 1.000
Table 3:  World prices of p1, p2, pa, and pc in the multi-
country fragmentation example  
(for reference, pb is the domestic price of B in the central (K/L = 1) zero-
trade-cost country)
The consumer price index e(p1, p2 ) in the central (K/L = 1) zero-trade-cost country is numeraire
Thus all numbers shown are also the domestic prices of this central, free-trade country.  All prices 
are World prices p
w except pb, which is not traded in any of the scenarios$TITLE: MULTI.GMS  for paper "Expansion of trade at the extensive margin..."
*  James Markusen author
*  model solves 36,863 non-linear inequalities in 36,863 unknows
*  each country designated by a two-dimensional set:
*  i = trade cost index  j = endowment index
*  uses Rutherford's higher-level language MPS/GE, produces figures 3 and 4
SET     I   countries' trade-cost index    /1*31/,
        J   countries' endowment index     /1*41/,
        F   factors of production          /L, S/;
PARAMETERS
 TC(I)                  trade cost X and Y (gross - one plus trade cost rate)
 TCA(I), TCB(I), TCC(I) trade costs for A B and C
 ENDOW(I,J,F)           endowment of country I-J of factor F
*  choose factor intentsities
 AX           amount of A used in X
 BX           amount of B used in X
 BY           amount of B used in Y
 CY           amount of C used in Y
 FA(F)        primary factors used in A
 FB(F)        primary factors used in B
 FC(F)        primary factors used in C
*  indices used to show what each country produces in each "regime"
 RA(I,J)      if country i-j produces A then RA = 100  zero otherwise
 RX(I,J)      if country i-j produces A then RA = 10   zero otherwise
 RB(I,J)      if country i-j produces A then RA = 1    zero otherwise
 RY(I,J)      if country i-j produces A then RA = 0.1  zero otherwise
 RC(I,J)      if country i-j produces A then RA = 0.01 zero otherwise
*  regimes stored as numbers for each country i-j
*  AT - autarky, N - trade in X-Y only, AC - trade in X-Y-A-C, C trade X-Y-C
 REGAT(I,J)  equals RA(IJ)+RX(IJ)+RB(IJ)+RY(IJ)+RC(IJ) in the autarky eq
 REGN(I,J)   equals RA(IJ)+RX(IJ)+RB(IJ)+RY(IJ)+RC(IJ) with X-Y trade only
 REGAC(I,J)  equals RA(IJ)+RX(IJ)+RB(IJ)+RY(IJ)+RC(IJ) with X-Y and A and C trade
 REGC(I,J)   equals RA(IJ)+RX(IJ)+RB(IJ)+RY(IJ)+RC(IJ) with X-Y and C trade
 VOTN(I,J), VOTCAPN(I,J)  volume of trade and as a share of income X-Y trade
 VOTAC(I,J),VOTCAPAC(I,J) volume of trade and as a share of income X-Y-A-C trade
 VOTC(I,J), VOTCAPC(I,J)  volume of trade and as a share of income X-Y-C trade
 DVOTNAC(I,J) change in VOTCAP from adding A-C trade to X-Y trade
 DVOTNC(I,J)  change in VOTCAP from adding C trade to X-Y trade
 WELAT(I,J)   welfare of country i-j in autarky
 WELN(I,J)    welfare of country i-j with trade in X-Y only
 WELAC(I,J)   welfare of country i-j with trade in X-Y-A-C
 WELC(I,J)    welfare of country i-j with trade in X-Y-C
 DWELN(I,J)   change in welfare of country i-j from autarky to N (X-Y trade)
 DWELAC(I,J)  change in welfare of country i-j from N to AC
 DWELC(I,J)   change in welfare of country i-j from N to C
*  the star "*" is a GAMS wild card set designator "RES" is short for "RESULTS"
*  in the following, the wild card is a regime indicator (AT, N, AC, C)
 RESWEL(*,I,J) welfare of country i-j in regime *
 RESVOT(*,I,J) trade volume of country i-j in regime *
 RESREG(*,I,J) which goods country i-j produces in regime *
 WPRICE(*,*) first wild card: regime - second is world price of X-Y-A-B-C
*  these parameters will indicate if the model solves correctly
 MODELSTATAT, MODELSTATN, MODELSTATAC, MODELSTATC;















        X(I,J)       ! production level of X for country i-j
        Y(I,J)       ! production level of Y for country i-j
        A(I,J)       ! production level of A for country i-j
        B(I,J)       ! production level of B for country i-j
        C(I,J)       ! production level of C for country i-j
        EA(I,J)      ! exports of A by country i-j
        IA(I,J)      ! imports of A by country i=j
        EB(I,J)      ! exports of B by country i-j
        IB(I,J)      ! imports of B by country i=j
        EC(I,J)      ! exports of C by country i-j
        IC(I,J)      ! imports of C by country i=j
        EX(I,J)      ! exports of X by country i-j
        IX(I,J)      ! imports of X by country i=j
        EY(I,J)      ! exports of Y by country i-j
        IY(I,J)      ! imports of Y by country i=j
        XX(I,J)      ! production of X in i-j supplied to the domestic market
        YY(I,J)      ! production of Y in i-j supplied to the domestic market
        W(I,J)       ! welfare index for country i-j
$COMMODITIES:
        PW(I,J)      ! utility price index (real consumer price index) of i-j
        PX(I,J)      ! producer price (marginal cost) of X in country i-j
        PY(I,J)      ! producer price (marginal cost) of Y in country i-j
        PA(I,J)      ! producer price (marginal cost) of A in country i-j
        PB(I,J)      ! producer price (marginal cost) of B in country i-j
        PC(I,J)      ! producer price (marginal cost) of C in country i-j
        PCX(I,J)     ! consumer price of X in country i-j
        PCY(I,J)     ! consumer price of Y in country i-j
        PF(I,J,F)    ! price of factor F in country i-j
        PFA PFB PFC  ! world price of A, B, C
        PFX PFY      ! world price of X, Y
$CONSUMERS:
        CONS(I,J)    ! income of representative consumer in country i-j
$PROD:X(I,J) s:1
        O:PX(I,J)        Q:100
        I:PA(I,J)        Q:AX
        I:PB(I,J)        Q:BX
$PROD:Y(I,J) s:1
        O:PY(I,J)        Q:100
        I:PB(I,J)        Q:BY
        I:PC(I,J)        Q:CY$PROD:A(I,J) s:1
        O:PA(I,J)        Q:50
        I:PF(I,J,F)      Q:FA(F)
$PROD:B(I,J) s:1
        O:PB(I,J)        Q:50
        I:PF(I,J,F)      Q:FB(F)
$PROD:C(I,J) s:1
        O:PC(I,J)        Q:50
        I:PF(I,J,F)      Q:FC(F)
$PROD:EX(I,J)
        O:PFX            Q:100
        I:PX(I,J)        Q:(100*TC(I))
$PROD:EY(I,J)
        O:PFY            Q:100
        I:PY(I,J)        Q:(100*TC(I))
$PROD:IX(I,J)
        O:PCX(I,J)       Q:100
        I:PFX            Q:(100*TC(I))
$PROD:IY(I,J)
        O:PCY(I,J)       Q:100
        I:PFY            Q:(100*TC(I))
$PROD:XX(I,J)
        O:PCX(I,J)       Q:100
        I:PX(I,J)        Q:100
$PROD:YY(I,J)
        O:PCY(I,J)       Q:100
        I:PY(I,J)        Q:100
$PROD:EA(I,J)
        O:PFA            Q:100
        I:PA(I,J)        Q:(100*TCA(I))
$PROD:IA(I,J)
        O:PA(I,J)        Q:100
        I:PFA            Q:(100*TCA(I))
$PROD:EB(I,J)
        O:PFB            Q:100
        I:PB(I,J)        Q:(100*TCB(I))
$PROD:IB(I,J)
        O:PB(I,J)        Q:100
        I:PFB            Q:(100*TCB(I))
$PROD:EC(I,J)
        O:PFC            Q:100
        I:PC(I,J)        Q:(100*TCC(I))
$PROD:IC(I,J)
        O:PC(I,J)        Q:100
        I:PFC            Q:(100*TCC(I))
$PROD:W(I,J) s:1
        O:PW(I,J)        Q:200
        I:PCX(I,J)       Q:100
        I:PCY(I,J)       Q:100
$DEMAND:CONS(I,J)
        D:PW(I,J)        Q:(SUM(F, ENDOW(I,J,F)))




OPTION SOLPRINT = OFF;
*  choose the consumer price index of central country (average world endowment)
*  with zero trade cost to be numeraire
PW.FX("31","21") = 1;
* set endowments for country i-j (LOOP(j,  )
* set trade costs (LOOP(i,  ) everone and everything has prohibitive trade cost
* compute autarky equilibrium
LOOP(I,
LOOP(J,
ENDOW(I,J,"S") = (180+(160/40) - (160/40)*ORD(J));























SOLVE MULTI USING MCP;
MODELSTATAT = MULTI.MODELSTAT;
RA(I,J) = 100$(A.L(I,J) GT 0);
RX(I,J) = 10$(X.L(I,J) GT 0);
RB(I,J) = 1$(B.L(I,J) GT 0);
RY(I,J) = 0.1$(Y.L(I,J) GT 0);
RC(I,J) = 0.01$(C.L(I,J) GT 0);
REGAT(I,J) = RA(I,J) + RX(I,J) + RB(I,J) + RY(I,J) + RC(I,J) ;
WELAT(I,J) = W.L(I,J);
WPRICE("AT", "PX") = PFX.L;
WPRICE("AT", "PY") = PFY.L;
WPRICE("AT", "PA") = PFA.L;
WPRICE("AT", "PB") = PFB.L;
WPRICE("AT", "PC") = PFC.L;
*  allow trade in X-Y at each country's trade cost
*  compute regime N: trade in X-Y permittedLOOP(I,
TC("31") = 1.0001;















SOLVE MULTI USING MCP;
MODELSTATN = MULTI.MODELSTAT;
RA(I,J) = 100$(A.L(I,J) GT 0);
RX(I,J) = 10$(X.L(I,J) GT 0);
RB(I,J) = 1$(B.L(I,J) GT 0);
RY(I,J) = 0.1$(Y.L(I,J) GT 0);
RC(I,J) = 0.01$(C.L(I,J) GT 0);
REGN(I,J) =   RA(I,J) + RX(I,J) + RB(I,J) + RY(I,J) + RC(I,J) ;
WELN(I,J) =   W.L(I,J);
DWELN(I,J) = (WELN(I,J) -  WELAT(I,J))/WELAT(I,J);
VOTN(I,J) = (PX.L(I,J)*EX.L(I,J) + PCX.L(I,J)*IX.L(I,J) +
            PA.L(I,J)*EA.L(I,J) + PA.L(I,J)*IA.L(I,J) +
            PB.L(I,J)*EB.L(I,J) + PB.L(I,J)*IB.L(I,J) +
            PC.L(I,J)*EC.L(I,J) + PC.L(I,J)*IC.L(I,J) +
            PY.L(I,J)*EY.L(I,J) + PCY.L(I,J)*IY.L(I,J))/2;
VOTCAPN(I,J) = VOTN(I,J)/(PW.L(I,J)*W.L(I,J));
WPRICE("N", "PX") = PFX.L;
WPRICE("N", "PY") = PFY.L;
WPRICE("N", "PA") = PFA.L;
WPRICE("N", "PB") = PFB.L;
WPRICE("N", "PC") = PFC.L;




TCA(I)$(ORD(I) LT 31) = 1.0001 + (1.16**(30 - ORD(I)))*0.005;
TCC("31") = 1.00025;









SOLVE MULTI USING MCP;
MODELSTATAC = MULTI.MODELSTAT;
RA(I,J) = 100$(A.L(I,J) GT 0);
RX(I,J) = 10$(X.L(I,J) GT 0);
RB(I,J) = 1$(B.L(I,J) GT 0);
RY(I,J) = 0.1$(Y.L(I,J) GT 0);
RC(I,J) = 0.01$(C.L(I,J) GT 0);
REGAC(I,J) =   RA(I,J) + RX(I,J) + RB(I,J) + RY(I,J) + RC(I,J) ;
WELAC(I,J) =   W.L(I,J);
DWELAC(I,J) = (WELAC(I,J) -  WELN(I,J))/WELN(I,J);
VOTAC(I,J) = (PX.L(I,J)*EX.L(I,J) + PCX.L(I,J)*IX.L(I,J) +
            PA.L(I,J)*EA.L(I,J) + PA.L(I,J)*IA.L(I,J) +
            PB.L(I,J)*EB.L(I,J) + PB.L(I,J)*IB.L(I,J) +
            PC.L(I,J)*EC.L(I,J) + PC.L(I,J)*IC.L(I,J) +
            PY.L(I,J)*EY.L(I,J) + PCY.L(I,J)*IY.L(I,J))/2;
VOTCAPAC(I,J) = VOTAC(I,J)/(PW.L(I,J)*W.L(I,J));
DVOTNAC(I,J)= VOTCAPAC(I,J)- VOTCAPN(I,J);
WPRICE("AC", "PX") = PFX.L;
WPRICE("AC", "PY") = PFY.L;
WPRICE("AC", "PA") = PFA.L;
WPRICE("AC", "PB") = PFB.L;
WPRICE("AC", "PC") = PFC.L;











SOLVE MULTI USING MCP;
MODELSTATC = MULTI.MODELSTAT;
RA(I,J) = 100$(A.L(I,J) GT 0);
RX(I,J) = 10$(X.L(I,J) GT 0);
RB(I,J) = 1$(B.L(I,J) GT 0);
RY(I,J) = 0.1$(Y.L(I,J) GT 0);
RC(I,J) = 0.01$(C.L(I,J) GT 0);
REGC(I,J) =   RA(I,J) + RX(I,J) + RB(I,J) + RY(I,J) + RC(I,J) ;
WELC(I,J) =   W.L(I,J);
DWELC(I,J) = (WELC(I,J) -  WELN(I,J))/WELN(I,J);
VOTC(I,J) = (PX.L(I,J)*EX.L(I,J) + PCX.L(I,J)*IX.L(I,J) +
            PA.L(I,J)*EA.L(I,J) + PA.L(I,J)*IA.L(I,J) +
            PB.L(I,J)*EB.L(I,J) + PB.L(I,J)*IB.L(I,J) +
            PC.L(I,J)*EC.L(I,J) + PC.L(I,J)*IC.L(I,J) +
            PY.L(I,J)*EY.L(I,J) + PCY.L(I,J)*IY.L(I,J))/2;
VOTCAPC(I,J) = VOTC(I,J)/(PW.L(I,J)*W.L(I,J));
DVOTNC(I,J)= VOTCAPC(I,J)- VOTCAPN(I,J);
WPRICE("C", "PX") = PFX.L;
WPRICE("C", "PY") = PFY.L;
WPRICE("C", "PA") = PFA.L;
WPRICE("C", "PB") = PFB.L;
WPRICE("C", "PC") = PFC.L;
*  check if all four cases solve correctly
DISPLAY MODELSTATAT, MODELSTATN, MODELSTATAC, MODELSTATC;*  collect results
RESWEL("DWELN", I,J)     = DWELN(I,J);
RESWEL("DWELAC", I,J)    = DWELAC(I,J);
RESWEL("DEWELC", I,J)    = DWELC(I,J);
RESVOT("VOTN", I,J)      = VOTCAPN(I,J);
RESVOT("DVOTAC", I,J)    = DVOTNAC(I,J);
RESVOT("DVOTC", I,J)     = DVOTNC(I,J);
RESREG("REGN", I,J)      = REGN(I,J);
RESREG("REGAC", I,J)     = REGAC(I,J);
RESREG("REGC", I,J)      = REGC(I,J);
*  dump results to EXCEL file called MULTI
$LIBINCLUDE XLDUMP RESWEL  MULTI SHEET1!A3
$LIBINCLUDE XLDUMP RESVOT  MULTI SHEET2!A3
$LIBINCLUDE XLDUMP RESREG  MULTI SHEET3!A3
$LIBINCLUDE XLDUMP WPRICE  MULTI SHEET4!A3